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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
There is no dispute between the parties that this Court, has appellate 
review jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate this matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There is no real dispute between the parties as to the issues on appeal 
and the applicable standard of review. The issue as to whether Mr. Norris was an 
independent contractor or an employee is one of law although it is required to 
apply the facts of the employment relationship in nrdpi *j make . I 
determination. The issue of whether Mr. Norris's injury occurred during the 
course and scope of his employment or occurred after that relationship was 
terminated is also a mixed question of law and fact. 
It is Petitioner's position that the Labor Commission's decision in this 
matter did "exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality...." AE Clevite. 
Inc. v. Labor Commission. 2000 UT App 35, 996 P.2d 1072. In reviewing the 
factual findings of administrative agencies the appellate Court must review the 
"whole record" and consider not only the evidence supporting the agency's 
factual findings, but also the evidence that "fairly detracts from the weight of the 
[Commission's] evidence." Ihe agency s findings of fact will tip affirmed only if 
they are "supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See also, Nvrehn v. Industrial 
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Commission. 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1991). 
Not addressed by Respondents, but contained in virtually all of the cases 
they cite on the Standard of Review is the legal principle that all doubts regarding 
an employee's right to compensation must be resolved in favor of the employee. 
See. McKesson Corp. v. Labor Commission. 41 P.3d 468 (Utah App. 2002). "It is 
the duty of the courts and the commission to construe the Workers' 
Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when statutory 
terms reasonably admit such a construction." Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 
P.2d 676 (1990). 
Preservation for Appeal: There is also no dispute that all of the raised 
issues were properly preserved for appeal and that the Petition for Review was 
timely filed with this Court by Petitioner. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE 
Respondents do not dispute that Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2005) 
provides the overall statutory basis for an award of workers' compensation 
benefits to an employee arising out of and in the course of employment and that 
Section 34A-2-102 and 103 (2005) of the Code fleshes out the definitions of 
"employer" and "employee" in determining workers' compensation 
responsibilities. Respondents provide no other "Determinative Statutes or Rules." 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts in this matter are simple, straightforward and apparently 
not really disputed by the parties. Respondents devote a mere four paragraphs to 
their recitation of the facts, none of which are at variance to the marshaling of the 
facts as provided by Petitioner. Much of Respondent's fact statement contains 
Respondent's counsel's characterization of the testimqny and is irrelevant, such 
as references to alleges threats to file civil litigation. 
Respondent's only objection is that "... petitioner's statement of facts is 
replete with references to his own testimony contradicting the facts as found by 
the ALJ and the Commission. UEF submits that the relevant facts are those 
found by the Commission, adopting the ALJ's findings-not petitioner's testimony 
to the contrary." See, Respondent Uninsured Employers Fund's Brief at page 5, 
footnote 1. 
Petitioner fully cited the Labor Commission's Decision and Findings. 
Citation to Petitioner's testimony was done in discharging Petitioners duty to 
marshal the evidence and to show that the Commission's decision disregarded 
important facts which were not even weighed or discussed. Respondent's implied 
objection to the citation to testimony given undei o;ith at Hearing in this matter is 
puzzling and without any support in law. 
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SUMMARY OF REPLY 
A fair view of all of the evidence and testimony shows that Mr. Norris was 
an employee of Respondent Harold Van Adams. Mr. Adams, personally or 
through his agent, Mr. Warburton, exercised sufficient "supervision and control" 
over Mr. Norris' work activities to make him an employee and not an independent 
contractor. 
Although Petitioner's workplace injury occurred after the date Respondents 
alleged he had been terminated, he is nonetheless entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits as his activities on that date fell within the scope of his 
employment. 
A R G U M E N T 
I 
PETITIONER WAS AN EMPLOYEE AND NOT AN INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR AT THE TIME OF HIS WORKPLACE INJURY. 
The parties agree that the threshold question is whether Petitioner 
functioned as an independent contractor or as an employee of Respondent 
Harold Van Adams. 
A. Part or Process in the Trade or Business 
Respondents opening argument is that the Labor Commission "... 
observed specifically that 'the work Mr. Norris performed was not 'part or process 
in the trade or business' of Mr. Van Adams' rental enterprise-a conclusion 
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petitioner has not contested. R. 187." See, Respondent's Brief, page 9. 
However an examination of the Commission's Order Amending Al , J's Decision 
and Affirming Denial of Benefits (R. 1 at 185-189 and copy attached to Petitioner's 
original Brief as Addendum "B") shows that although the Commission made the 
sweeping statement that "Further, the work Mr. Norris performed was not part or 
process in the trade or business" of Mr. Van Adams' business, as required under the 
statute," there were no facts stated to support that allegatior). 
There is no evidence to indicate how the Commission reached that conclusion, 
especially in light of the fact that they specifically "adopfted] Judge Lima's findings of 
facts." (R.1 at 185). ALJ Lima, who heard the testimony and was in the best position to 
evaluate the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses found and concluded that Mr. 
Norris was an employee. (R. at 130-131). 
Any reference to "part or process in the trade or business" was at best an after 
thought that was not "'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
Action v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336 (Utah 1979)) ... [T]he failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact on 
material issues renders its findings 'arbitrary aiid capricious' unless the evidence is 
'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion.' jd. (Quoting Kinkella v. 
Bauqh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
It is undisputed that Respondent Van Adam's business was in the 
apartment rental business. (R. at 127). Inherent in that business is the repair and 
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maintenance of the rental units. Petitioner's work was far more that just replacing 
carpet or addressing a particular plumbing issue. The ALJ made Findings which 
the Commission adopts without modification that Mr. Norris was an employee. 
His work was so encompassing, including showing units and giving out rental 
applications to prospective renters, (R. 1 at 128) that he could not fairly be 
considered an independent contractor. Respondent Van Adams was not in the 
business of repairing and maintaining rental units belonging to other property 
owners, but he was very much in the business of maintaining and repairing his 
units so that they would be suitable for rent. 
The parties agree as to the applicable elements of control that indicate an 
employee relationship rather than independent contractor status. As argued by 
Petitioner, and not disputed by Respondents, this Court in Mitchell v. Rice. 885 
P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1994) held that in determining whether a worker is an 
independent contractor or an employee that: 
We look primarily to the following factors: (1) 
whatever covenants or agreements exist concerning the 
right of direction and control over the employee, 
whether express or implied; (2) the right to hire and fire; 
(3) the method of payment, i.e., whether in wages or 
fees, as compared to payment for a complete job or 
project; and (4) the furnishing of the equipment, 
(citations omitted). Id. at 821. 
Although Respondent addresses them in a different order than spelled out 
by this Court, the application of the above principles of law invariably leads to the 
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legal conclusion reached by Administrative Law Judge Lima that Petitioner was 
an employee of Respondent Harold Van Adams. 
B. Direct Evidence of Right of Control. 
Respondent's sole argument is to claim that Mr. Warburton, Respondent 
Harold Van Adams agent, was only on the job site for three days. They do, 
however, allege that Mr. Warburton testified and the P\U found that he "was on 
the property about once a week. See, Respondent's Brief at 16. There is no 
specific evidence or time sheets in evidence that show how often he was actually 
on the job site, but one need not be actually physically present in order to 
exercise control over employees. Such control can easily be done by telephone, 
for example. 
The Labor Commission made no unique Findings as to the degree of 
control that Respondent Adams and his agents exercised over the project. They 
did, however, adopt the Findings of the ALJ who specifically found that Mr. 
Warburton and Mr. Van Adams were on the job site frequently enough to 
conclude that they were dissatisfied with how long Mr. Norris took to complete 
the project. (R. 1 at 130). The record is replete with examples of the control that 
Mr. Warburton and Respondent exercised. The ALJ found that Respondent's 
agent, Mr. Warburton, instructed Petitioner to, among other things: board up 
windows, change locks, replace thermostats, repair drywall, a pothole, a gutter 
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spout and a toilet handle, tear out carpeting, determine where leaks occurred and 
purchase cleaning supplies and paint. He hired painters and other helpers at Mr. 
Warburton's request. (R. 1 at 126-131). These Findings of Fact were adopted 
by the Labor Commission. (R. 1 at 185). 
Petitioner testified that whenever there was any disagreement on how to 
fix a problem that Mr. Warburton had the final say and that he frequently 
overruled Petitioner and gave specific instruction on how he wanted repairs 
done. (R. 3 at 24-25, 31-32, 34, 43-44). 
The Petitioner further testified that during the last couple of weeks that he 
worked for Respondent, that Mr. Adams personally took control over the project. 
He gave Petitioner time limits on completing certain projects and specific 
directions on how he was to do certain repairs. (R. 3 at 28, 45-47). The only 
contrasting evidence was Mr. Warburton's bald allegation in regards to the 
project that "I don't think that anybody supervised." (R. at 191). As argued 
above, if there is doubt on this issue, it must be resolved in favor of the injured 
worker and workers compensation coverage. McKesson Corp. v. Labor 
Commission. 41 P.3d 468 (Utah App. 2002). 
Respondents place heavy reliance on the fact that the ALJ characterized 
(and the Labor Commission did not disagree) the work done by Petitioner was 
done at Mr. Warburton's instruction or consent." (Respondent's Brief at 15). The 
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italics on "or consent" were added by Respondent's counsel and do not appear in 
the ALJ's opinion. In fact, she never cites any activity performed by Petitioner 
that the Respondents merely "consented" or acquiesced to. 
In this section, Respondents only cite the testimony of Mr. Warburton 
which was not cited or referred to by the Labor Commission and which contradict 
the facts found by the ALJ. In this regard they are guilty of their own complaint a 
mere few pages earlier in their Brief, where they allege that "... petitioners 
statement of facts is replete with references to his own testimony contradicting 
the facts as found by the ALJ and the Commission. UEF submits that the 
relevant facts are those found by the Commission, adbpting the ALJ's findings-
not petitioner's testimony to the contrary." (Respondent's Brief at 5, footnote 3). 
While there are some inconsistencies between the sworn testimony of the 
Petitioner and Mr. Warburton as set out in the Respondent's Brief, the ALJ who 
actually heard and observed those witnesses testify resolved those conflicts in 
favor of the Petitioner. The Commission adopted those findings, only departing 
on Petitioner's allegation that "he was offered $40 an hour to complete the 
project." (R1. at 186). 
C. Right to Hire and Fire. 
Respondent completely ignores this important factor. It is only addressed 
in passing in their Brief and even then it is to admit that St was Mr. Warburton who 
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hired "helpers" separately and that they did not work under Petitioner's 
supervision. (See, Respondent's Brief at 17). It is undisputed that Petitioner did 
not have the authority on his own initiative to hire others to assist him. Mr. 
Warburton, however, did on occasion direct him to hire others to assist him and 
instructed Petitioner on how much and how often to pay those workers. (R.3 at 
18-19,21). 
Mr. Warburton testified that Petitioner did not have the authority to hire 
others and that he [Warburton] hired the painters and others. (R. 3 at 115, 132, 
136). It is also undisputed that Petitioner did not have the authority to fire any of 
the so called "helpers." 
As Petitioner argued and Respondents do not deny, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 65 Utah 168, 235 P.884 (1928), noted: 
"An independent contractor can employ others to do the work and accomplish the 
contemplated result without the consent of the contractee, while an employee 
can not substitute another in his place without the consent of the employer." Id at 
888. 
The Respondents also do not dispute that Petitioner himself was ultimately 
fired by Respondents. This is a legally significant event in determining whether 
Petitioner was an employee or an independent contractor. Professor Larson in 
his treatise on Workers' Compensation Law comments on the legal significance 
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of such a termination: 
The power to fire, it is often said, is the power to 
control. The absolute right to terminate the relationship 
without liability is not consistent with the concept of 
independent contractor, under which the contractor 
should have the legal right to complete the project 
contracted for and to treat any attempt to prevent 
completion as a breach of contract. 
Larson's Workers' Compensation, § 61.08 [1] (11p2). 
D. The Method of Payment. 
Respondent's entire argument is that this was a flat fee project at 
$1,500.00 for all services. They make numerous citations to Respondent's agent 
Mr. Warburton's testimony to such effect. The most illustrative citation is that Mr. 
Warburton testified that "$1,500 was the budget for the total project. Period. I 
said we have a budget. If you can do it within his [sic] budget, do it. If he can't 
don't do it." (R. 191, cited in Respondent's Brief at 12.) 
The problem with that self serving allegation is ^hat is undisputed that Mr. 
Norris on December 6, 2005 was paid $4,000.00, ev0n though the project was 
still incomplete. (R. 1 at 186). Neither the Commission nor the Respondents offer 
any explanation as to why Respondent Adams uncontrovertedly paid $4,000.00 
on what he steadfastly maintained was a $1,500.00 flat fee project for all services 
to be rendered. 
That payment is entirely inconsistent with the Labor Commission's Finding 
l i 
that only $1,500.00 was to be paid to Petitioner for the entire job. The Labor 
Commission makes no findings on the point between the alleged flat fee and the 
ultimate payment for an unfinished job. The ALJ, who as previously commented 
heard all the testimony and submission of exhibits, resolved it by finding that 
Petitioner was an employee and not a flat fee independent contractor. 
The Labor Commission in its Order states that although Petitioner testified 
that he was to be paid hourly that they "find the other testimony more credible." 
(R1 at 186, including footnote 1). The Commission however never specifies what 
that "other testimony" was. Respondent objects that Petitioner's failure to identify 
the "other testimony" is evidence of failure to marshal the evidence, but they 
never offer any evidence to the contrary other than the specious and factually 
disproved alleged $1500.00 budget for the needed repairs. 
Even the Labor Commission acknowledged that the undisputed evidence 
indicated that on December 23, 2005, Petitioner requested an additional 
$9,800.00 for services rendered.(R. 1 at 186). The Labor Commission never 
gave any indication how they resolved that discrepancy other than the prior 
allegation of credibility. The ALJ who did preside over the Hearing found an 
employer/employee relationship. The Commission engaged in totally inadequate 
Fact Finding to support its spurious legal conclusion on this point. 
> 
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E. The Furnishing of Equipment (Tools and Supplies). 
The ALJ specifically found (and the Labor Commission adopted that 
Finding) that the Petitioner used his own tools and truc^ to repair the rental units. 
They were to be stored in a garage located on the rental property "per Mr. 
Warburton's request." (R. 1 at 127-128). Petitioner readily admitted this point 
and Respondent's attempt to capitalize it as a new fapt falls short. Respondent 
purchased paint and cleaning supplies for Petitioner to use and also provided a 
trailer so Petitioner could haul garbage away. Petitioher was instructed to buy 
other required supplies and to keep receipts so he could be reimbursed. Those 
allegations are not disputed and are entirely inconsistent with independent 
contractor status despite Respondent's bald and unsupported allegation 
otherwise. In fact, as Respondent's acknowledge, they "took pains to make sure 
that petitioner's tools would be secure." See, Respondent's Brief at 19, R. 191). 
When one views the totality of the evidence, specifically focusing on the 
element of control as indicated in the above four areas, the evidence is 
overwhelming that Petitioner was an employee and not an independent 
contractor. The ALJ made a specific finding that Petitioner worked for 
Respondent as an employee with respect to the repair work on the rental 
property in Midvale, Utah. (R. 1 at 131). The Labor Commission never clearly or 
specifically indicates why they departed from that determination despite adopting 
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all of the ALJ's Findings of Fact without reservation or qualification. 
II 
PETITIONER WAS IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE SUFFERED A COMPENSABLE WORKPLACE 
INJURY. 
A. Injury Arising Out of And in The Course of Employment. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 34A-2-401 provides for specified workers 
compensation benefits for injuries "... by accident arising out of and in the course 
of employment. 
The ALJ devoted only a single paragraph to the discussion of this issue, 
although it served as the sole and exclusive basis for her denial of any and all 
workers compensation benefits to the Petitioner. In rendering her decision on this 
point, the ALJ cited no case law or statutory support. The sole basis for her 
determination on this point was her conclusion that: 
Petitioner's accident and related medical condition occurred on 
December 26, 2005, after the employment relationship was severed 
by Respondent. Accordingly, Petitioner did not sustain an injury 
within the time and space boundaries of the employment and in the 
course of an activity whose purpose was related to his employment 
with Respondent. (R.1 at 131). 
The Labor Commission paid even less attention to this pivotal issue, 
relegating it to two short sentences in a footnote as follows: "The Commission 
notes that regardless of whether Mr. Norris had proven he was an employee of 
Mr. Van Adams, the employment relationship had ended at the time of the 
14 
accident. Thus, Mr. Norris would still not have been entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits." (R.1 at 187). No other analysis on this point is provided 
by the Commission. 
As Petitioner pointed out in his original Brief, in reviewing the factual 
findings of an administrative agency the Appellate Court reviews the "whole 
record" before the court and considers not only the evidence supporting the 
Agency's factual findings, but also the evidence that "fairly detracts from the 
weight of the [Commission's] evidence." The agency's findings of fact will be 
affirmed only if they are "supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
There is significant dispute as to when the employment relationship was 
severed. Although Respondent testified that it occurred on December 23, 2005, 
that testimony is inherently self serving. It is extremely convenient, and suspect, 
that Respondent claims to have terminated his employment relationship with 
Petitioner just shortly before Petitioner is injured on the job. Although Petitioner's 
testimony could also be alleged to be self-serving, as Respondent's counsel 
alleges, neither the ALJ nor the Labor Commission makes any Finding which 
would support that conclusion. 
There is, in fact, no independent documentary evidence to show that 
Petitioner's employment was terminated on Decembef 23, 2005, as alleged by 
15 
Respondent. Petitioner acknowledged that the parties had a falling out, but 
testified that he was not terminated until approximately New Years Day, 2005. 
Petitioner's testimony is support by the fact that he continued to perform work for 
Respondent after December 23rd, when he was allegedly terminated. There is no 
evidence to the contrary. Respondent's Brief is completely devoid of any refutation on 
this point. 
In particular, Petitioner had worked for approximately three hours at the 
Holden Street job site on December 26th before he was injured. Respondent's 
testimony that Petitioner had been discharged on December 23rd and had "taken 
his tools and left" is disproved by the undisputed fact that Petitioner was injured 
on December 26th while removing his air compressor from the work site. There 
was no dispute that the Petitioner was injured on that date and on Respondent's 
property while loading his work tools in his truck. 
B. Liability For Workers Compensation Benefits Can Extend for 
a Reasonable Period Past the Exact Time of Termination. 
Even if one were to assume that Petitioner was discharged on December 
23, 2005, some three days before his industrial injury, that alone would not 
defeat his entitlement to workers compensation benefits. Respondent seeks to 
differentiate the cases and authorities cited by Petitioner on this point, but that 
effort is misguided. It is significant that Respondent offers no independent 
authority of its own to show that workers compensation coverage would not 
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extend to cover such a situation, even assuming an alleged prior termination. 
Their effort to distinguish cited authority falls flat, especially since they seek to 
distinguish facts but not the legal principles enunciated. 
Respondents cite no cases providing a hard ijne that the employment 
relationship is completely severed on the date of termination such that workers 
compensation coverage does not extend to any activity beyond that specific date 
and time. Despite the lack of Utah case law directly oH point, the law from other 
jurisdictions is replete with authority for the extension JDf workers compensation 
coverage past the exact time of termination. 
While it is possible to pick at the fact situation jin each case, the global 
legal principal set for in each case by Petitioner has not be refuted. Nicholson v. 
Industrial Commission, 76 Ariz. 105, 259 P.2d 547 (19$3) supports the principle 
that workers compensation coverage extends through a lunch period after 
discharge. Respondent only seeks to differentiate the fbcts of that case and this 
one by stating "What difference should it make that the^e was to be a cessation 
of work until the following morning." See, Respondent'^  Brief at 23. One might 
ask what difference should it make if there was to be a cessation of work for a 
couple of days over a holiday? The critical inquiry is as to the nature and extent 
of the employment relationship, not the hard line of tljie alleged and disputed 
termination date. 
17 
St. Anthony Hospital v. James. 889 P.2d 1279 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) 
stands for the proposition that workers' compensation coverage has also been 
required for injuries sustained when, following termination the former employee 
returns to the worksite to collect his or her final pay, even when that occurs days 
later. Respondent's seek to distinguish that case by alleging that the claimant in 
St. Anthony's had not been paid all the money she was owed and that the case 
only stands for the proposition that the employment relationship continues until 
the worker has been paid. They allege that it is not applicable to this case as "... 
respondent Adams had paid petitioner all the money he believed petitioner was 
due." See, Respondent's Brief at 24. 
Respondent's position would make the employment relationship 
dependent on the viewpoint and good faith of the employer, without regard to the 
wage claims of the employee. Petitioner testified and Respondents acknowledge 
that he claimed additional sums as being due and owing. An employer can't 
escape his employment duties simply by claiming he has paid all sums due, 
despite evidence to the contrary. 
St. Anthony cannot be limited solely to the issue of wage payment. 
Professor Larson noted, "Collecting one's personal effects on leaving 
employment is logically no different from collecting one's pay, since both are 
necessary incidents of an orderly termination of the employment relation". 
18 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 26.04 (Rel. 94-06/05). 
Respondent's efforts to distinguish Herman v. ^herwood Industries, Inc.. 
244 Conn. 502, 710 A.2d 1338 (1998), likewise fails, The clear holding and 
rationale in that case extended workers compensatibn coverage beyond the 
bright line of the date and time of termination, to include the retrieval of tools and 
personal effects. In that case, like this one, the tools were kept on the 
employer's premises for the benefit of both the claimant and employer and thus 
the accident was held to have occurred during an activity that was incidental to 
employment and subject to workers compensation coverage. 
Respondents seek to distinguish Nails v. Market Tire Co.. Inc., 29 Md. 
App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (1975) wherein a discharged employee alleged that he 
injured his back while lifting his tools he had returned to retrieve two days after 
being fired. The Maryland Court found that his injury arose in the course of his 
employment. Respondents claim that the holding in that case was dependent on 
the fact "it was customary to allow employees two or three days to remove their 
tool" and that there is no custom or practice by Respondent Van Adams of 
likewise allowing a reasonable period in which to remove tools and personal 
effects. 
In this case, it should be noted that December 23rd, the date Respondent 
alleges Petitioner was terminated, was a Friday. The time of day of the alleged 
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discharge was not testified to. Even if one were to resolve the conflict in the 
evidence as to the date of termination in favor of the Respondent, it must be 
recognized that the following day, a Saturday, was Christmas Eve and the day 
after that, a Sunday, was Christmas. Due to the size and weight of the air 
compressor, Petitioner needed help loading it and it is only reasonable that he 
would have to return latter with the needed help. No one disputes that his injury 
occurred on Monday, December 26th, which is a very short and reasonable time 
after the alleged discharge, especially in light of the intervening holidays. 
Petitioner's injuries occurred on Respondent's property, while Petitioner 
was retrieving his work tools. There was evidence that Petitioner was still 
employed on that date and had been rendering services for the Respondent, his 
employer. Even if the injury occurred "post termination," he would still be entitled 
to workers compensation coverage because he was injured during "a necessary 
incident of an orderly termination of the employment relationship." 
Ill 
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY IN 
FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER, 
Respondents make a frontal attack on the "liberal construction" rule 
arguing that it "deprives the Commission of its broad grant of discretion in 
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matters involving workers compensation which are subject only to scrutiny for 
reasonableness and rationality. See, Respondent's Brief at 26. They cite no 
cases repudiating or reversing the principle.. 
The liberal construction rule has been favorably cited by the Utah Courts 
from Chandler v. Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (IjJtah 1919) to the present. 
This legal principle simply provides that the workers cojnpensation statutes must 
be liberally construed in favor of coverage and that reasonable doubts in the 
evidence must also be construed in favor of providirig workers compensation 
coverage. It does not deprive the Labor Commission of its statutory duty and 
power to adjudicate workers compensation cases rather it provides a standard 
which the Commission must apply when so doing. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons above cited, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court 
of Appeals reverse the Labor Commission and direct th$t the case be remanded 
to the Administrative Law Judge for the entry of an awartd of benefits. 
DATED this 12th day of Mayy2010. 
Melvin A. C(^ ok 
Counsel for Petitioner, Richard Norris 
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